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Abstract 
This study shows that the district level outcomes in the 
2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia are 
significantly associated with the mean household 
deprivation levels. This effect is statistically significant 
after controlling for the regional dummies, 
urbanisation level, current district’s population size, 
the proportion of orthodox population, local 
ideological preferences, and the rate of turnout on the 
election day. The OLS models of the share of received 
votes in the proportional system and the logit models 
of the odds of victory of a party candidate in the 
majoritarian contest both reveal that the districts with 
the lowest and highest material deprivation levels 
were more likely to vote for the oppositional coalition. 
The results are robust even after excluding from the 
analysis two fraud-prone regions of Samtskhe-
Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli.   
 
 
Keywords: Parliamentary elections, Georgia, material 
deprivation, multivariate analysis   
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Research Question 
The 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia has been already hailed  as a political 
milestone in the democratic development of Georgia. For the first time after the 
1990 elections, the authorities declared an oppositional political force as the winner 
of the electoral contest. In addition to the expected political, economic and social 
consequences, the recent developments might also reinvigorate applied social 
research of the electoral politics and voter behaviour in Georgia. All previous 
election results were classified as either partly free or the ruling political force 
achieved a landslide victory. Both of these characteristics prevented researchers 
from making empirical investigation of the covariates of electoral outcomes. In the 
case of election falsification, the official results could not be reliably matched with 
contextual variables, while in the case of a landslide victory, the low variation in the 
election results restricted the explanatory power of statistical models. On both of 
these accounts the 2012 parliamentary elections differed from the previous ones. 
On the one hand, the domestic and international observers largely agree that the 
degree of freedom and transparency was reasonably high. On the other hand, 
although the gap between the winning Georgian Dream Coalition (GDC) with 55.0 
percent of votes and the incumbent United National Movement (UNM) party with 
40.3 percent is small, the variation in votes among the various districts is 
substantial.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the distribution of votes among political parties 
across 73 electoral districts. The standard deviations of the shares of votes received 
by the winning and incumbent sides among districts are 15.4 and 15.2 percent, 
respectively, which gives us an opportunity to engage scientifically with the possible 
explanations in the observed results.1 It is obvious that a large share of variation can 
be explained by the regional differences. The districts in Guria, Mtskheta-Mtianeti 
and Tbilisi predominantly voted for the GDC; the districts in Samtskhe-Javakheti, 
                                                          
1 Other political parties received 4.7 percent of votes with 1.3 standard deviation among the 
districts.  
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Khvemo-Kartli and Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti preferred the UNM; while the mixed 
result were observed in Racha-Lechkhumi, Kakheti, Adjara and Shida Kartli. 
However, the regional difference cannot explain the variation observed among 
districts within 10 different regions and in Tbilisi. It has been speculated that the 
defeat of the incumbent UNM was conditioned by the various political, economic 
and social shortcomings, but in this study I am particularly interested how social 
welfare is related with the district level election outcomes. Although data 
availability on the district level contextual variables is severely restricted, I manage 
to generate a households’ material deprivation measure from the large 
representative social survey, and controlling for some basic covariates such as 
population size, urbanization, the religious, educational and ideological composition, 
test its association with the election outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
Research Design, Data and Methods  
A unit of analysis in this study is an electoral district. The Central Election 
Commission also provides election results for separate election precincts within the 
election districts. A higher number of observations would improve the explanatory 
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power of statistical models but other contextual variables on the same level are not 
available. I use two complementary dependent variables The first is the share of 
votes received by the GDC in the proportional electoral contest across districts. This 
is a continuous variable which takes value from .17 to .93. The second dependent 
variable is the victory of the GDC candidate in the majoritarian contest in various 
districts, which is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the coalition candidate wins a 
district. The results would vary only marginally if the share of the UNM and its 
candidates’ victories were used as the dependent variables. This is because less than 
5 percent of votes went to third political parties which means that the lower share 
of votes for the Georgian Dream Coalition means almost proportionally higher share 
of votes for the UNM. For the robustness check of the findings I also use the 
combined share of votes received by other political parties. It is not possible to use 
majoritarian results for other political parties because none of their candidates won 
any election district.      
The main independent variable and other controls are generated from the 
Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE, 2012). The data was collected by the Georgian Centre of 
Population Research (GCPR) in 2006 from the entire territory of Georgia except of 
the areas that were not covered by the population census of 2002 (Badurashvili, 
2012). The GGS is a national representative survey and includes 10,000 
observations. The large sample of the GGS allows to derive the aggregate measures 
of local context which can serve as independent variables in the current study. This 
is done in the following way: I allocate all observations available in the GGS into 64 
election districts. Because GGS data is not segregated according to the districts in 
the capital city, I have to drop 10 districts of Tbilisi and transform Tbilisi districts 
into a single observation.2 The GGS also misses observations for Signagi electoral 
district and therefore the former is excluded from the analysis. The values for our 
independent variables are the mean values of the selected variables derived 
                                                          
2 This should not be a problematic step because results in Tbilisi did not vary significantly 
across districts. 
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separately for all 64 electoral districts. As the number of individual level 
observations varies across districts the level of representativeness of aggregated 
variables might vary from district to district.   
The main independent variable of the study is the households’ material 
deprivation levels in the electoral districts. This variable is generated by aggregating 
answers on the following GGS question: ‘For each item, please indicate whether or 
not your household possesses it. It does not matter whether the item is owned, rented, 
or otherwise provided for your use. If you do not have an item, please indicate whether 
you would like to have it but cannot afford it, or do not have it for other reasons, e.g. 
you don't want or need it.’ Eleven separate dummy variables take value of 1 if the 
respondents indicate that their households would like but cannot afford to have the 
following items: (1) a refrigerator, (2) colour TV, (3) video recorder or DVD player, 
(4) washing machine, (5) microwave, (6) home computer, (7) dishwasher, (8) 
telephone (whether fixed or mobile), (9) a car or a van available for private use, (10) 
a second car, (11) a second home (e.g. for vacation). The dummy variables then are 
summed and the average value for each electoral district is calculated. It has to be 
stressed that, along with other variables, the survey measures material deprivation 
in 2006 and some changes have probably taken place after this date. However it is 
reasonable to hypothesise that levels of deprivation in 2012 are closely related to 
those in 2006. In addition, if the overall situation improved in the recent years, 
which is unlikely considering the persistently high poverty levels (Gugushvili, 2011), 
then yet it is not expected that the rise in material conditions significantly varied 
across regions and districts.    
I also employ five control variables. Rural-urban divide has been one of the 
important vectors of voting preference in electoral studies. Therefore, I create a 
variable which shows the share of GGS respondents who lived in urban settlements 
across electoral districts in 2006. This variable cannot be a true measure of 
urbanisation but it can serve as a good proxy of rural-urban divide in the electoral 
districts. The same approach is applied to the level of education among the districts’ 
population. The mean values of individual level educational attainment, which itself 
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varies from 1=pre-primary education to 7=second stage of tertiary education, are 
used as proxies for the average level of education in districts. Based on the previous 
elections in Georgia, it is important to control for ethnic composition of districts. 
The GGS does not ask respondents about their ethnicity but enquires about their 
religious affiliation. According to the Caucasus Barometer (Caucasus Research 
Resource Centers, 2010), being an orthodox is strongly correlated with being a 
Georgian in the country and therefore the level of orthodox population can be used 
as the proxy of ethnic composition of the electoral districts. In other normal 
conditions, electoral outcomes can be also related to the ideological preferences, 
hence I calculate the district mean values of answers on the following question from 
the GGS: ‘There are widely varying views on how we should care for people in our 
society. Please indicate whether you think financial support for younger people with 
children below subsistence level it is mainly the task for society, the family or for both.’ 
The answer options vary from 1=mainly a task for society, to 5=mainly task for 
family. The lower/higher values of this indicator must indicate that left/right-wing 
ideology dominates in the district. Two additional control variables – the size of 
population in electoral districts and the rate of turnout in the election day  – derives 
from the National Statistics Office of Georgia (Geostat, 2012) and the Central 
Election Commission (2012). The full descriptive statistics can be viewed in Table 1 
of the appendix.  
Based on two different forms of the dependent variable, I consecutively use 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic (logit) regressions. OLS models are applied 
when the dependent variable is the share of votes received by the GDC, while logit 
regression are used when the dependent variable is the victory of party candidate in 
the majoritarian contest. To account for heteroskedasticity in models, robust 
standard errors are estimated in both types of regressions (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). In order to make regression output easily comparable across models, I 
standardize all variables which do not have binary form. The limited number of 
observations and the related degrees of freedom restrictions, does not permit to test 
material deprivation’s association with the dependent variables controlling for all 
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outlined control variables. The independent variables are still introduced in the 
models at the verge of models’ degrees of freedom and by comparing different 
regression specifications, it is possible to derive statistically meaningful conclusions. 
Since historically concerns have been raised about the quality of electoral process in 
two regions with the large share of ethnic minorities, after the main part of the 
analysis I conduct robustness checks by excluding the electoral districts belonging 
to these regions and repeating the same analysis to check the validity of derived 
results with more rigorous sample. 
 
 
Results 
I start with the description of the bivariate relationship between households’ mean 
deprivation rates and the share of votes received by the opposition. Horizontal axis 
in Figure 2 plots material deprivation across districts which varies from 3.29 to 9.79 
in Gardabani and Tianeti districts, respectively. The distribution of votes is in line 
with the regional differences, Sachkhere district being a clear outlier. It is noticeable 
that the scatterplot of deprivation and election outcomes does not depict any linear 
association. If anything, there appear to be a U-shaped curvilinear relationship 
between the two. As we can see, many of districts are located in the middle of 
deprivation distribution and their voting preferences seem to be neutral, or more 
skewed toward the UNM. On the other hand, a high number of districts are 
positioned in the lower as well as the higher parts of household deprivation levels 
and both of these groups tend to have the stronger preferences for the GDC. It has to 
be stressed that the observed curvilinear relationship might be driven by the 
inclusion in the analysis some of the problematic districts or even whole regions. To 
test the association between the household deprivation levels and voting behavior 
more convincingly, the next step will be multivariate analysis which can isolate 
other contextual effects in the considered relationship. At the same time, to account 
for possible U-shaped curvilinear association, I include in the regression models 
households’ material deprivation variable together with its squared term. If both of 
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these regression coefficients are statistically significant and have the opposite signs 
(– and +), it will be the evidence on curvilinear association between the dependent 
and independent variables.         
 
 
 
Table 1 depicts regression coefficients from OLS models. Different independent 
variables are consecutively introduced into the models, while the final regression 
includes most of the covariates. Model 1 shows that mean material deprivation as 
such does not associate significantly with the dependent variable. On the other hand, 
Models 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 indicate that districts’ population size, urbanization share 
of orthodox population, mean educational level and the rate of turnout correlate 
positively and significantly with the variation in the votes’ distribution, while mean 
ideological preferences does not have any effect. However, when the listed 
covariates are introduced simultaneously in Model 8, the households material 
deprivation and it squared term become statistically significant with the negative 
and positive signs, respectively. What this means is that material deprivation, as it 
was the case in Figure 2, maintains U-shaped curvilinear relationship on the 
electoral outcomes at  the 0.05 significance level. It seems that as the deprivation 
intensifies districts are less likely to prefer the opposition, but after a certain 
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threshold the higher deprivation levels are significantly related to stronger support 
for the oppositional coalition.    
The regional dummies, as expected, strongly associate with the electoral 
preferences. The populations of Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Samegrelo 
districts are much more likely to cast their votes for the UNM. The effect is 
maintained when their preferences are compared to Tbilisi in Model 9 or when they 
are compared to all other regions, including Tbilisi, in Model 10. The latter model 
also includes all other contextual covariates, except material deprivation, and its 
purpose is to show how much variation is explained by material deprivation which 
is introduced in Model 11. I am not able to include all regions in the final model 
because of the limited degrees of freedom in the sample with only 63 observations. 
The results confirm that share of the orthodox population and rural status of the 
region both have statistically significant association with casting the votes for the 
GDC. Most importantly, I find that material deprivation still maintains U-shaped 
curvilinear relationship with the dependent variable. If Model 10 explained 54 
percent of variation in the dependent variable then the introduction of material 
deprivation in Model 11 increases the explained share of the votes’ distribution, 
Adjusted R2, in by 3 percent.    
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Table 1: Covariates of the share of votes received by the GDC across electoral districts in the 2012 Georgian Parliamentary elections 
Coefficients from OLS models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Intercept –0.18 –0.15 –0.18 –0.18 –0.18 –0.18 –0.16 –0.16*   1.10***   0.13   0.15* 
Socio-economic variables            
Material deprivation  –0.82 – – – – – – –1.21* – – –1.19** 
Material deprivation2   0.78 – – – – – –   1.09* – –   1.04* 
Demographic variables             
Population size –   0.18*** – – – – – -0.01 – –0.03 -0.05 
Index of urbanisation –    0.39*** – – – –   0.35** –   0.38***   0.36*** 
Share of orthodox population – – –   0.44*** – – –   0.26* –   0.19   0.21* 
Education and ideology       –     
Mean level of education – – – –   0.41***     0.05 – –0.01   0.03 
Financial support for children – – – – – –0.01    0.15 –   0.16   0.16 
Election characteristic              
Rate of turnout  – – – – – –   0.37***   0.30** –   0.26*   0.20 
Region             
Adjara – – – – – – – – –1.15*** – – 
Guria – – – – – – – – –0.62*** – – 
Imereti – – – – – – – – –0.77** – – 
Kakheti – – – – – – – – –1.21*** – – 
Kvemo Kartli  – – – – – – – – –2.03*** -0.44 -0.73** 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti – – – – – – – – –0.19 – – 
Racha-Lechkhumi – – – – – – – – –1.32*** – – 
Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti  – – – – – – – – –1.72*** –0.82*** -0.81*** 
Samtskhe-Javakheti  – – – – – – – – –2.47*** –1.34*** -1.32*** 
Shida kartli  – – – – – – – – –0.82*** – – 
Observations   63   64   63   63   63   63   64   63   64   63   63 
Adjusted R2 –0.02   0.02   0.15   0.19   0.17 –0.02   0.14   0.36   0.35   0.54   0.57 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. All dependent and independent variables, except regional dummies are standardised. 
Reference category is Tbilisi in Model 9 and all other regions except Kvemo Kartli, Samegrelo, amd Samtskhe-Javakheti in Model 10 and 11. Robust standard errors are 
calculated, not shown. Source: Author’s calculation based on the data from the Central Elections Commission (2012), Generations and Gender Survey (UNECE, 2012), 
Geostat (2012)  
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Table 2: Covariates of the victory of the GDC across electoral districts in the 2012 Georgian Parliamentary elections 
Coefficients from bivariate logistic regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Intercept   0.04 0.35 0.07 -0.00 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.45 14.28*** 1.22* 1.16* 
Socio-economic variables            
Material deprivation  –2.33 – – – – –  –4.00 – – –6.61** 
Material deprivation2   2.03 – – – – –    3.53 – –   5.78** 
Demographic variables            
Population size – 1.31 – – – –    1.70 –   2.18   1.29 
Index of urbanisation  – – 0.76*** – – –    0.74* –   0.98**   0.93* 
Share of orthodox population – – – 0.71** – –    0.77* –   0.63   0.73* 
Education and ideology            
Mean level of education – – – – 0.62** –    0.04 – –0.59 –0.01 
Financial support for children – – – – –   0.11    0.41 –   0.48   0.39 
Election characteristic              
Rate of turnout  – – – – – – 0.48*   0.67 –   0.45   0.21 
Region             
Adjara – – – – – –  –   14.28*** – – 
Imereti – – – – – –  – –3.59*** – – 
Kakheti – – – – – –  – –4.28*** – – 
Kvemo Kartli  – – – – – –  – –6.08*** –2.84** –4.62** 
Racha-Lechkhumi – – – – – –  – –5.38*** – – 
Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti  – – – – – –  – –4.98*** -1.49 –1.51 
Samtskhe-Javakheti  – – – – – –  – –5.89*** –2.30** –2.71*** 
Observations   63   64   63   63   63   63 64   63   53   63   63 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.14  0.29  0.38 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. All dependent and independent variables are standardised. Reference categories is 
Tbilisi in Model 9 which also excludes districts in Guria, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, and Shida Kartli (perfectly predict success). In Model 10 and 11 and all other regions except 
Kvemo Kartli, Samegrelo, amd Samtskhe-Javakheti serve as the reference category. Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Source: Author’s calculation based 
on the data from the Central Elections Commission (2012), Generations and Gender Survey (UNECE, 2012), Geostat (2012)  
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The same independent and control variables are tested in Table 2 but in this case the 
dependent variable is the victory of the GDC candidate in the majoritarian contest across the 
electoral districts. The higher urbanization levels, share of orthodox population and levels of 
education are associated with the higher odds of oppositional candidate winning a district. In Model 
8, when all covariates are tested together, only urbanisation rate and the share of orthodox 
population maintain positive association at .1 significance level. In Model 9 the oppositional 
candidates have the lowest odds of victory in the same regions as in the proportional contest. Model 
11 shows that the introduction of material deprivation variable and its squared term increases 
Pseudo-R2 by 9 percentage points which is rather high improvement of the fit of the model. In 
addition, considering the sample size, both material deprivation variables maintain strong 
statistical significance. For robustness check of these findings, I conduct an additional test. In Table 
2a and 3a in the Appendix, I exclude from the analysis observations from the electorally 
problematic regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli. Similarly to the main analysis with all 
districts, the households’ material deprivation still upholds U-shaped curvilinear statistically 
significant association with both dependent variables – the votes’ allocation in the proportional and 
majoritarian electoral contests. Furthermore, the size of coefficients seem to be even stronger when 
the regions with ethnic minorities are excluded from the calculations. Last but not least, I also test 
the links between material deprivation and the votes for other political parties. The results, 
reported in the Appendix’s Table 4a, show that material deprivation has the strong and significant 
inverse U-shaped relationship with the dependent variable, which is similar to the association 
expected for the UNM. In other words, electoral outcomes for other political parties were shaped 
similarly as for the UNM, which indicates on the proximity of voter profiles of these two political 
forces.   
 
 
Discussion 
The years of partly free political regime, as defined by the Freedom House (2012), did not allow 
free and transparent democratic elections to take place in Georgia, which in turn restricted the 
applied social research of electoral preferences and behaviour. The freer and fairer elections can 
open new opportunities for the investigation of electoral consequences, its covariates, and, possibly, 
its causal factors. This study might be one of the first steps of understanding electoral preferences 
in more democratic and unconstrained Georgian political environment. As my primary research 
interests concentrate on social welfare, I tested the links between material deprivation and district 
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level election outcomes. I show that the regions with the highest and the lowest deprivation levels 
were likely to prefer the GDC, while those regions with medium deprivation level tended to vote for 
the United National Movement. However, the fact that the higher levels of deprivation, until certain 
threshold, negatively associates with the share of oppositional votes in the districts as well as with 
the probability of victory of their majoritarian candidate does not necessarily mean that there is a 
direct causal link between the deprivation and election outcomes. The districts where the material 
deprivation levels are high, but not the highest, are less likely to be those which have the better 
access to free media and are more likely to be dependent on the state benefits such as Targeted 
Social Assistance. Both of these characteristics could make voters less informed and critical about 
the state of affairs and more dependent on the incumbent public officials. On the other hand, when 
the deprivation levels reach a certain threshold the voters’ frustration might be the dominant cause 
of electoral outcomes. To conduct a more convincing investigation of the electoral preferences, 
individual level data on voting preferences and other socio-economic variables are required, which 
then can be combined with district level characteristics in a multilevel statistical framework.   
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Appendix 
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis  
Location of districts Dependent variables Ind. variable Control variables 
District Region Proportional Majoritarian  Mean 
households 
deprivation 
levels  
Population in 
thousands 
Urbanisation 
index  
Share of 
orthodox 
population  
Mean level of 
education 
Perception of 
the financial 
support 
younger 
people with 
children  
Share of the 
Georgian 
Dream 
Coalition 
votes  
Victory of a 
Georgian 
Dream 
Coalition 
candidate  
Tbilisi Tbilisi 0.67 1 5.31 1172.70 0.96 88.94 4.02 2.22 
Sagarejo Kakheti 0.57 0 5.98 60.00 0.12 74.22 3.25 2.48 
Gurjaani Kakheti 0.45 1 7.70 69.70 0.14 96.00 3.18 1.97 
Signagi Kakheti 0.49 0 n/a 43.80 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dedoflistskaro Kakheti 0.49 0 6.67 30.60 0.32 97.44 3.72 2.47 
Lagodekhi Kakheti 0.39 0 6.30 52.10 0.20 78.69 3.22 2.20 
Kvareli Kakheti 0.46 1 7.32 37.30 0.33 97.33 3.52 1.87 
Telavi Kakheti 0.49 1 6.83 71.20 0.33 79.33 3.51 2.78 
Akhmeta Kakheti 0.52 1 7.10 42.40 0.24 73.00 3.34 2.44 
Tianeti Mtskheta 0.59 1 9.79 13.10 0.00 100.00 3.21 3.04 
Rustavi Kvemo Kartli 0.56 0 5.34 122.50 1.00 96.00 3.83 2.51 
Gardabani Kvemo Kartli 0.41 0 3.29 99.70 0.11 41.52 2.78 3.12 
Marneuli Kvemo Kartli 0.17 0 5.70 129.60 0.22 13.27 2.70 3.16 
Bolnisi Kvemo Kartli 0.29 0 5.28 78.70 0.20 60.16 3.02 1.98 
Dmanisi Kvemo Kartli 0.26 0 3.56 28.90 0.00 50.00 2.68 1.52 
Tsalka Kvemo Kartli 0.28 0 7.02 23.50 0.00 44.00 2.18 3.18 
Tetritskaro Kvemo Kartli 0.51 1 5.44 28.40 0.42 83.05 3.31 1.81 
Mtskheta Mtskheta 0.63 1 5.98 57.60 0.31 97.15 3.43 2.18 
Dusheti Mtskheta 0.64 1 4.77 34.10 0.25 98.04 3.42 2.08 
Kazbegi Mtskheta 0.70 1 8.48 4.90 1.00 88.89 3.52 1.67 
Kaspi Shida Kartli 0.57 1 7.69 53.00 0.29 97.03 3.35 1.66 
Gori Shida Kartli 0.48 1 4.92 146.10 0.22 96.80 3.60 2.03 
Kareli Shida Kartli 0.54 1 4.73 52.90 0.22 79.37 3.10 2.31 
Khashuri Shida Kartli 0.58 1 5.84 62.60 0.51 99.03 3.51 2.20 
Borjomi Samtskhe 0.63 0 4.46 31.80 0.50 98.00 2.96 2.24 
Axaltsikhe Samtskhe 0.21 0 5.59 48.60 0.50 47.00 3.54 3.13 
Adigeni Samtskhe 0.27 0 6.02 20.90 0.00 80.00 3.02 2.70 
Aspindza Samtskhe 0.23 0 7.64 13.10 0.00 96.00 3.12 3.00 
Akhalkalaki Samtskhe 0.21 0 5.62 65.00 0.20 4.00 3.18 2.56 
Ninotsminda Samtskhe 0.17 1 6.32 34.80 0.00 4.00 2.84 2.67 
Oni Racha-Lechkhumi 0.53 0 5.68 8.30 0.50 98.00 2.92 2.76 
Ambrolauri Racha-Lechkhumi 0.50 1 6.06 14.10 0.50 98.00 3.40 2.44 
       Continued on the next page 
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       From the previous page 
District Region Proportional Majoritarian  Mean 
households 
deprivation 
levels  
Population in 
thousands 
Urbanisation 
index  
Share of 
orthodox 
population  
Mean level of 
education 
Perception of 
the financial 
support 
younger 
people with 
children  
Share of the 
Georgian 
Dream 
Coalition 
votes  
Victory of a 
Georgian 
Dream 
Coalition 
candidate  
Tsageri Racha-Lechkhumi 0.41 0 6.48 15.60 0.00 96.00 3.28 2.92 
Lentekhi Racha-Lechkhumi 0.42 0 6.08 9.00 0.00 100.00 3.24 2.68 
Mestia Samegrelo 0.51 1 7.60 14.60 0.00 100.00 3.32 3.12 
Kharagauli Imereti 0.51 1 4.31 27.40 0.03 98.67 3.35 2.72 
Terjola Imereti 0.47 0 7.82 45.10 0.28 100.00 3.46 1.17 
Sachkhere Imereti 0.93 1 5.16 48.10 0.20 100.00 3.31 3.62 
Zestaponi Imereti 0.61 1 7.36 75.70 0.36 98.86 3.72 3.27 
Bagdati Imereti 0.49 1 9.59 28.80 0.00 98.68 3.29 2.30 
Vani Imereti 0.37 0 8.87 33.80 0.00 97.33 3.15 2.93 
Samtredia Imereti 0.55 1 5.62 60.80 0.50 99.00 3.41 2.59 
Khoni Imereti 0.47 0 9.38 31.50 0.34 100.00 3.38 2.96 
Chiatura Imereti 0.75 1 8.13 55.30 0.33 98.68 3.48 2.54 
Tyibuli Imereti 0.47 1 5.27 30.10 0.33 100.00 2.92 2.33 
Tskaltubo Imereti 0.41 0 8.19 74.10 0.17 99.32 3.38 2.95 
Kutaisi Imereti 0.57 1 6.13 196.80 1.00 99.58 4.02 2.70 
Ozurgeti Guria 0.59 1 7.07 78.50 0.26 97.06 3.61 2.18 
Lanchkhuti Guria 0.61 1 4.65 39.00 0.25 96.00 3.33 1.90 
Chochatauri Guria 0.52 1 4.09 22.80 0.00 74.67 3.15 2.47 
Abasha Samegrelo 0.38 0 8.69 27.70 0.33 98.67 3.76 1.28 
Senaki Samegrelo 0.37 0 6.85 52.60 0.50 100.00 3.44 2.00 
Martvili Samegrelo 0.40 0 6.50 45.00 0.25 100.00 3.68 2.71 
Khobi Samegrelo 0.37 1 8.01 41.80 0.00 96.05 3.22 2.50 
Zugdidi Samegrelo 0.33 0 5.98 178.20 0.57 99.43 3.54 2.79 
Tsalejikha Samegrelo 0.32 0 6.55 40.90 0.35 97.33 3.61 2.16 
Chkhorotsku Samegrelo 0.36 0 8.46 30.80 0.02 100.00 3.86 2.80 
Poti Samegrelo 0.59 1 4.69 47.90 1.00 100.00 3.67 2.69 
Batumi Adjara 0.65 1 5.80 125.80 1.00 72.43 3.89 2.20 
Keda Adjara 0.45 0 6.60 20.50 0.00 8.00 2.96 2.44 
Kobuleti Adjara 0.57 1 6.13 93.00 0.34 44.44 3.27 4.11 
Shuakhevi Adjara 0.29 0 6.36 22.90 0.00 18.00 3.00 2.16 
Khelvachauri Adjara 0.64 1 4.46 95.60 0.00 21.95 3.37 3.43 
Khulo Adjara 0.35 0 5.60 35.90 0.10 16.00 2.96 3.12 
Source: Central Election Commission (2012), UNECE (2012), Geostat (2012) 
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Table 2a. Covariates of the share of votes received by the GDC across electoral districts 
Coefficients from OLS regressions, excluding districts in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.01 1.10***  0.10    0.19* 
Socio-economic variables     
Material deprivation  -1.39* – – -1.23* 
Material deprivation2 1.25* – – 1.09 
Demographic variables     
Population size -0.05 – -0.06 -0.08 
Index of urbanization  0.39*** – 0.34*** 0.32*** 
Share of orthodox population 0.02 – 0.09 0.09 
Education and ideology  –   
Mean level of education 0.07 – 0.17 0.21* 
Financial support for children 0.20* – 0.22* 0.20* 
Election characteristic      
Rate of turnout  0.38**  0.31* 0.27 
Region      
Adjara – –1.15*** – – 
Guria – –0.62*** – – 
Imereti – –0.77** – – 
Kakheti – –1.21*** – – 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti – –0.19 – – 
Racha-Lechkhumi – –1.32*** – – 
Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti  – –1.72*** -0.84*** -0.81*** 
Shida Kartli  – –0.82*** – – 
Observations   50    51    50    50 
Adjusted R2   0.27    0.21 0.39 0.41 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. All dependent and independent variables, except 
dummies for regions are standardised. Reference category is Tbilisi in Model 2 and all other regions except Samegrelo in Models 3 and 4. 
For other specifications and sources refer to Table 2 in the main text  
 
Table 3a. Covariates of the victory of the GDC candidate across electoral districts in the 2012 Georgia 
Parliamentary elections, coefficients from bivariate logistic regressions, excluding districts in Kvemo Kartli 
and Samtskhe-Javakheti  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept   1.21   15.97***   1.11*   1.22* 
Socio-economic variables     
Material deprivation  –9.11*** – – –8.64*** 
Material deprivation2   8.11*** – –   7.64** 
Demographic variables     
Population size   1.54 –   1.77   1.01 
Index of urbanization    0.73 –   0.69*   0.57 
Share of orthodox population   0.44 –   0.48   0.54 
Education and ideology     
Mean level of education –0.38 – –0.47 –0.07 
Financial support for children   0.32 –   0.48   0.31 
Election characteristic      
Rate of turnout      0.24 –0.07 
Region      
Adjara – –15.97*** – – 
Imereti – –15.28*** – – 
Kakheti – –15.97*** – – 
Racha-Lechkhumi – –17.07*** – – 
Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti  – –16.67*** –1.46 –1.39 
Observations   50   40    50    50 
Adjusted R2   0.26   0.09   0.16   0.28 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Guria, Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Shida kartli are dropped 
from model 6 because they perfectly predict outcome variable. All independent variables, except dummies for regions are standardised. 
Reference category is Tbilisi in Model 2 and all other regions except Samegrelo in Models 3 and 4. For other specifications and sources 
refer to Table 2 in the main text 
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Table 4a: Covariates of the share of votes received by the GDC across electoral districts in the 2012 Georgian Parliamentary elections 
Coefficients from OLS models  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Intercept   0.03   0.02   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.02   0.02 –0.53   0.13   0.11 
Socio-economic variables            
Material deprivation    2.07*** – – – – – –   1.82** – –   1.53** 
Material deprivation2 –1.97*** – – – – – – –1.76** – – –1.52** 
Demographic variables            
Population size – –0.04 – – – – – –0.09 – –0.07 –0.07 
Index of rurality   – –   0.08 – – – – –0.10 –   0.11   0.08 
Share of orthodox population – – –   0.02 – – – –0.10 – –0.31 –0.28 
Education and ideology            
Mean level of education – – – –   0.17 – –   0.25 – –0.05 –0.07 
Financial support for children – – – –  –0.19 – –0.21 – –0.21 –0.21 
Election characteristic             
Rate of turnout  – – – – – – –0.08 –0.12 – –0.09 –0.04 
Region             
Adjara – – – – – – – –   1.72** – – 
Guria – – – – – – – – –0.25 – – 
Imereti – – – – – – – –   0.37 – – 
Kakheti – – – – – – – –   0.55* – – 
Kvemo Kartli  – – – – – – – –   0.00 –1.15** –0.92 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti – – – – – – – –   0.00 – – 
Racha-Lechkhumi – – – – – – – –   0.55*** – – 
Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti  – – – – – – – –   1.47***   0.96***   0.95*** 
Samtskhe-Javakheti  – – – – – – – – –0.37 –1.22* –1.27** 
Shida kartli  – – – – – – – –   0.92*** – – 
Observations   63   64   63   63   63   63   64   63   64   63   63 
Adjusted R2   0.04 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02   0.01   0.02 –0.01   0.01   0.27   0.19   0.20 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. All dependent and independent variables are standardised. Reference category is Tbilisi in Model 9 and all 
other regions, except Kvemo Kartli, Samegrelo, amd Samtskhe-Javakheti in Models 10 and 11. Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Source: Author’s calculation based on the 
data from the Central Elections Commission (2012), Generations and Gender Survey (UNECE, 2012), Geostat (2012)  
 
            
          
 
 
